To examine type inside the dyadic exchange because of the urban area, in Design 3 we create telecommunications terms and conditions between local-spouse-hypergamy and you can local-spouse-hypogamy, correspondingly, and also the city sign
In Hypothesis 1, we anticipate that hukou locality intermarriage is lower in Shanghai than in Shenzhen, because hukou policies are more stringent in Shanghai. To test this hypothesis, in model 1, we examine variations in hukou locality assortative mating by city. Recall that we code the cells along the main diagonal as 1 and those off the diagonal as 0 in the cross-tabulation between hukou locality of the husband and wife. Thus, hukou intermarriage in which spouses marry across hukou locality boundaries serves as the reference category and contrast with hukou homogamy. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, hukou locality homogamy is more pronounced in Shanghai than in Shenzhen: the odds of hukou locality homogamy are 5.37 and 3.97 times as high as the odds of hukou intermarriage in Shanghai and Shenzhen, respectively (Shanghai: ? = 1.68, exp(?) = 5.37, p < 0.001;>
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In Model 2, we examine dyadic exchange, which measures how the joint education characteristics of two spouses affect the likelihood of hukou locality inter). We hypothesize that local spouses are likely to use their advantageous hukou locality statuses in exchange for their migrant spouses’ good socioeconomic statuses, as captured by education attainment here. We expect local spouses to be more likely to y) within hukou intery. We also expect local spouses to be less likely to y) within hukou locality intery. Consistent with our expectations, we find an incentive to local-spouse-hypergamy and suggestive evidence of a disincentive to local-spouse-hypogamy. Specifically, locals in Shanghai and Shenzhen are 70% more likely to marry a more educated spouse when they marry a migrant spouse than when they marry a local spouse; in other words, the tendency for locals to marry up in education is stronger in hukou locality intery (? = 0.53, exp(? ) = 1.70, p < 0.01).> 0.05).
We find that the disincentive to local-spouse-hypogamy is more pronounced in Shenzhen than in Shanghai. Specifically, the local-spouse-hypogamy parameter is not significant in Shanghai (? = ?0.03,p > 0.05). In Shenzhen, locals are 56% less likely to marry a less educated spouse when they marry a migrant spouse than when they marry a local spouse (? = ?0.03 + (?0.78) = ?0.81, exp(?) = 0.44, p < 0.01).>
Model 4 examines ), and Model 5 examines city variation in the market exchange. Specifically, Model 4 estimates changes in the log-odds of hukou locality intermarriage as migrants’ or local spouses’ education changes from one level to another in Shanghai and Shenzhen combined, and Model 5 estimates how such associations differ between Shanghai and Shenzhen. To facilitate interpretation of results from Models 4 and 5, Figure 2 presents the log-odds of hukou intermarriage for each spouse type when education increases one category in both cities. The education of local spouses does not appear to be associated with their likelihood of hukou locality intermarriage (? = 0.16, p > 0.05; ? = 0.08, p > 0.05), whereas when migrant spouses’ education changes from high school to some college or above, their odds of hukou locality intermarriage increase Pakistani tyttГ¶ avioliittoon by 148% (? = 0.91, exp(?) = 2.48, p < 0.01).> 0.05).
Note: Log odds ratios of hukou intermarriage are estimated from Models 4 and 5 for each spouse type when education increases by one category in the two cities combined, in Shanghai, and in Shenzhen, respectively. The significance of each coefficient in Shenzhen is tested using a post-estimation Wald test. *p < 0.05;>